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VOL. VI. LEXINGTON, KY., FEBRUARY, 1.9 18. NO. 3
THE CITIZEN OWNERSHIP OF LANDS
By Lyman Chalkley.*
§ 1. The worth of ownership of land consists in mastery over
its fruits and comforts.
The State is considered to have been the original owner of all
the land; and, also, to have conferred ownership upon the private
person, by its grant, in the process of parcelling. By "owner" is
meant one who has the mastery over the fruits and profits, com-
forts and conveniences of a thing;' one who is in the present exer-
cise of the power of use and enjoyment of the fruits and profits,
comforts and conveniences, and of dictation of their future use
and disposition to the exclusion of all others. The character of this
mastery will have a different aspect, upon consideration of whether
the thing is animate, fugitive, movable, liable to loss through waste,
consumption and decay, on the one hand; and whether it is per-
manently fixed in position, not animate, movable, nor liable to loss
through waste, consumption, and decay, on the other hand. Ili
the first of these cases, mastery involves the power to determine
the conditions of existence of the thinig by physical restraint, and,
also, to maintain and uphold the owner's freedom of will in that
respect, against all other powers. In the second case, there is no
call for the owner's exercising restraint over the thing. In either
case, mastery over a thing involves the power of the master to
conduct himself in respect of that thing according to the dictates
of his own will.
Ownership has no application to anything that is not capable
of affording fruits and profits, comforts and conveniences beneficial
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to man. Dominion over all things was given to Adam; but Cain
formulated a special case by asserting mastery over another being
of the same family of creatures; the issue in -which was whether
the power of mastery given to Adam extended to males of the same
species; Cain contending that Abel, co-parcener with him in the
blood of the same father, was of no use, comfort or convenience
to him. Cain could find no use or convenience to himself in keep-
ing Abel, and despatched him forthwith. He might find profit in
keeping a male of a different species, but none in keeping a -male
of his own. Cain lost his case; but the judgment established and
illuminated the principle. The owner keeps the milch cow confined
in a stall for her own life for the sake of the milk she gives, and
when she ceases to give milk, she is led to the slaughter. The boy
keeps the squirrel in a cage for the diversion he affords. The miser
keeps his gold for fear of its wings.
But land does not wander around and stray away, nor is it
consumed; therefore, the owner is not a keeper. His mastery is
asserted by holding it, not against any inherent propensity or dis-
position of its own, but against the exercise of dominion by another;
by maintaining and defending his occupancy against all comers.
The mastery of the landowner, then, as distinguished from the
mastery of the owner of other things is that he "holds." Whether
the thing be such as will stray, or be consumed and lost; or will en-
dure in time and remain in place without keeping, the essential
consideration is always the fruits and profit, the comforts and con-
veniences to man. The worth of ownership is the worth of the usu-
fruct. Each is the measure of the other. Mastery over the usu-
fruct is ownership. The power of holding will naturally involve
the power of taking the usufruct; and the power of taking the
usufruct will naturally involve the power of holding. Holding is
a means only of securing the fruits.
Under the simple conditions of primitive life, the owner will
both hold, and take the usufruct. Whoever takes the usufruct must,
also, hold, or he will lose the benefits which constitute the only
worth. If the holding is performed by the State, that is, by or-
ganized society, ownership is reduced from mastery under the au-
thority of God to power over the fruits and profits, comforts and
conveniences, under the authority of the State.
§ 2. Possession is the state of holding under the authority of
organizedpower.
It woild be impossible that a man could acquire and exercise
ownership or mastery over a thing without (1) subjecting it to his
own will by physical restraint,, and (2) occupying or encompassing
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it with his own power; in other words, without taking it into his
actual possession. Without the possession he could not "hold it."
Under primitive conditions there would be no ownership without
occupation. In raw nature, where there is no association of indi-
viduals for mutual protection and support, a man cannot occupy
in person any greater extent of land than he can cover with his
body and reach with his limbs and weapons; his occupation will
be co-extensive with his possession, or power over it. He will.
"possess" what he "occupies" and holds by the might of his own
strong, right arm. His possession will be limited to the extent of
his occupation. Without the support of a suite or company of
retainers, a man can possess only so much land as he can hold;
that is, maintain his will over it. Without greater force than his
individual physical power to back his personal prowess, no man
should expect to hold any land for long secure against intrusion by
others. Thus he will possess what he can hold by the combined
force of himself and his aids; a conception which was apparent to
Wordsworth upon his contemplation of Rob Roy's grave. But with
the aid of the union of the elements of force and power contributed
by the members of his family, then of his tribe, then of an aggre-
gation of people united into a political society or state, he can
"hold" and also "possess" as much land as his society will under-
take to maintain him in. For the peace of the society, he will -be
allowed to use his own strong right arm. only in case of immediate
peril; the State is the author of force and exerts as much as is
required in all other cases.
Possession is thus a complex conception requiring very careful
consideration of its terms. It is much wider than "occupancy."
It denotes occupancy accomplished through power, not through per-
sonal presence; the range of exercise of power-by the possessor will
be much greater than that of his natural body. And the possessor
may possess land, and yet another occupy it by his authority. It
does not denote the act of bringing the thing into subjection to his
will and under the shadow of his shield. That we describe by va-
rious phrases: "take possession of," "make himself master of,'
"possess himself of"; nor is it a quality, but only an attribute of
ownership. It is a conception created by the law, and exists only
in contemplation. It denotes always power, instead of the personal
presence of .the occupant. It carries the idea of extension of the
atmosphere of the personal presence as far as his power will
reach. It denotes the state or condition of any one, who having
grasped or encompassed the thing, continues, through the exercise-
of power, to maintain his hold on it. Possession extends to all that
is owned, not alone to what is occupied.
The children's song relates that "the jay-bird crept in the
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wood-pecker's hole and he couldn't get him out to save his soul."
The jay-bird seized the. space, occupied it with his own presence,
and kept the wood-pecker in a state of being out; that is, he took
possession. That single performance involved three separate acts,
(1) causing the hole to rest' under his mastery and power; (2)
causing the hole to be filled with his own body as a permanent
condition of the hole; (3) causing the -wood-pecker to remain out,
as a permanent condition of the wood-pecker. These are respective-
ly, (1) Entry, .(2) Occupation, (3) Holding.
Until actual entry upon it, a man cannot "possess" land ac-
cording to any primary conceptions; in order to possess the land,
he must be in a situation to hold it physically; he is not in such a
position unless he stands within its boundaries and upon its sur-
face. The act of a man in placing himself in that situation is
called "entry." There can, of course, be no "occupation" without
entry. But after entry has been made and ownership established,
then, by the owner's voluntary act, possession may be delivered to
another, and yet.the owner remain owner,, by reason of two primary
rights, which will remain to him: (1) That he may re-enter and
re-possess himself if the other break any condition or term of the
agreement between them; and (2) That the possession will not be-
come vacant by the death- of the tenant, but will "revert" to the
owner of its own virtue and character. The one to .whom he deliv-
ers the possession may or may not '-'occupy" the land; whoever
bas the possession may install another under him in the "occupan-
cy" without delivering to him the possession. We speak of the
lawful presence of a man on land for a fixed period of time as
possession; but it .is not possession in the primary or correct sense.
Thus it will be seen that one may be the "owner" and yet
neither possess nor "occupy"; one may occupy without possessing
or owning.. The owner may have a dominion, and the possessor a
dominion. As possession exists only in consequence of some owner-
ship, one who possesses must posses under either his own or anoth-
er's ownership. Possession must be by some authority ordained by
law; ownership is of the eternal course of things. Occupancy is
of the will of the occupant; possession is of the flat of organized
power.
The immediate control of the land follows the possession and
not .ownership.: The owner may be the owner, because he has the
right of re-entry; the right of reverter, and the right of dictation of
future disposition; and yet not have the .immediate possession and
"hold" because he has parted with the possession. After he has
conferred the physical -land upon another, in the nature of things
there may remain to-him -the ownership, but in the form of rights
against the.possessor. .. It is not inconceivable, because it is uni-
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versally practiced, that he may even part with both the possession
and ownership, and yet have remaining to him a right of re-entry
and a possibility of reverter. In any of these cases there may still
remain to him the power and duty of regulating and protecting
the mode and manner of user of the land, Thus, the American state
exercises the power of police, not over the land, but in regulation
of the possession. The State has parted with both the possession
and ownership.
i 3. The organized power of the State may extend the own-
ership by descent, but not the possession.
As an original conception, the ownership will endure in time as
long as the owner can hold the occupancy by force; the farthest
extent of which will be his own life. Unless there is some organized
power which survives him and continues his ownership, it will
lapse, and the land be "open to another occupant. If there is such
a power, the ownership may be continued under its authority; but
both ownership and possession can exist only as an investment of
some person. It follows that both ownership and possession are
conceptions dependent upon organized power; ownership enduring
as long as the power prescribes, and possession for the life of the
possessor. There cannot be but one ownership, but it will endure
through a succession of lives, one after the other. There cannot
be but one possession, and it will cease upon the death of the pos-
sessor. The next possessor must receive the possession by a new
investiture. The conception, "possession," exists only as the gift
of a superior power, and possession is always necessarily under
that power.
The power which supports and maintains the possession will
naturally provide a rule to determine the person in whom the own-
ership shall be vested after the death of the person who last died
owner. While the possession resides with the ownership, yet, as has
been seen, the owner may let the possession out for a time to an-
other. If that other should die during the lifetime of the owner
who let him the possession, the possession will revert to the latter,
who has never ceased to be owner. If the owner should die while
the possession is out, then the possessor would have, immediately,
an absolute possession equivalent to ownership unless the ownership
traveled along a clearly marked line of succession of persons with-
out a new investiture with each successor. This quality of owner-
ship of land is found among all peoples as practically a primary
notion. Naturally the persons who will succeed to the ownership
will be the members of the household of the owner who are about
him at the time of his death. The earliest practice did not confine
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the succession to blood kin of the' owner, but extended to the mein-
bers of the group. "And Abraham said, Lord God, what wilt thou
give me, seeing I go childless, and the steward of my house is this
Eliezer of Damascus? And Abraham said, Behold, to me thou hast
given no seed; and lo, one born in my house is my.heir. And, behold,
.the word of the Lord came unto him, saying: This shall not be
thine heir; but he that shall come forth out of thine own bowels.
shall be thine heir." Through the operation of this principle, the
ownership will not lapse or suffer interruption as long as there is
a person designated heir to succeed.
.$ 4. The inheritance has the tour attributes, (1) Rent, (2)
Re-entry, (3) Reverter, (4) Descent.
That quality of ownership in accordance with which it does
not cease upon the death of a particular owner, but continues
through an indefinite succession of persons is called The Inherit-
ance. When the owner lets out the possession for a time there re-
mains to him, as has- been seen, a residue of complete ownership,
which residue consists of four particulars, (1) the right to receive
the service or render or return to be made by the possessor; (2)
the right to re-enter for a breach.of condition by the possessor;
(3) that upon the completion of the period of time designated for
the endurance of the possession, it will revert to the owner; (4) that
upon the death of the owner, the ownership will descend to his
heir. These four characteristics of ownership are called (1) The
Service or Rent; (2) Right of Re-entry; (3) Reverter; (5) Descent.
It is to be carefully noted that the heir receives his predeces-
sor's ownership, not a new ownership. The heir's ownership is the
extension of that of the ancestor The heir will have the same
'identical right; that is, he will have the rent, the right of re-entry,
the reverter and the inheritance; he will'have the right to receive
the rent, and the' power to re-enter where his ancestor could have
re-entered; there will be a reverter.to him where there would have
been a reverter to the ancestor, and there will be a descent to his
heirs, being .heirs of his ancestor.
Possession -for a time may be severed from the ownership; of
the residue of the ownership, called the Reversion, the rent, the
right of re-entry and the reverter will be incidents of the inherit-
ance; that is, they will run with the inheritance and appertain to the
owner of the inheritance. When the owner has let the possession
for a 'time to 'one, he may also dispose of the inheritance to another.
When this is done, the owner divests himself of his entire ownership
and nothing remains to him. The 'possession carries the physical
occupancy and holding, and the usufruct; the inheritance carries the
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rent, the reverter, and the determination of the course of descent
and the right to re-enter.. He cannot sell his land and have' it, too.
There seems to be no good reason, in the nature of things, why the
owner may not dispose of the inheritance and retain the possession.
*Which will, of course, be limited to his lifetime.
§ 5. In America, citizen or alodial ownership hs been sub-
stituted for feudal-holding.
From what has been said in the preceding paragraphs, it will
be apparent that there may be two dominions over the same piece
of land at the same time: (1) the dominion of ownership, and (2)
the 'dominion of possession or usufruct. The first harks back to
God as its author and warrantor; the author of the second is the organ-
ized power of the State. These have received the names of Dominium
Directum, and Dominium Utile. They may be called General Own-
ership and Possessory Ownership. Coke says: "The estate of
the king is direct ownership of which God alone is the author."
Dominium Directum is defined in a modern dictionary as "the own-
ership left in the superior lord as distinguished from the dominium
utile, the possessory right granted to the vassal." Possessory own
ership is secondary and subordinate to general ownership. There
will be necessarily some relation resulting between the general
owner and the possessory owner. As the inheritance is a constant
factor in all .cases, together with its incidents, re-entry and re-
verter, the relation in a particular case will necessarily involve the
return, render or rent, and such other services and terms of
holding under authority of the general owner as may be agreed
between the parties. In usage and piactice in the past, the terms
and services of holding have fallen into two classes: (1) fealty,
or personal allegiance to the general owner, in all that concerns his
welfare and maintenance; together with the render of some form
of valuable service; (2) the render of some form of valuable ser-
vice, alone. Which of these modes will apply in a particular case
will depend upon the special theory of holding in force in the
particular jurisdiction. In the American States three special the-
ories and practices of holding must be considered in order to de-
termine the nature of the theory obtaining in the particular state.
The first of these is the feudal practice in its original and simple
form; the second is the common law practice and custom evolved
out of the feudal, and in use at the time of the Revolution; the
third is the alodial theory introduced into practice in all the
States since the Revolution. These three are so involved and inter-
mingled in legal thought, expression and terminology, that it is
impossible to say that there is any determinate, settled practice
anywhere. But the student is to be advised that the courts have
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gotten, in the main, very far away, indeed, from the overwhelming
influence of feudal principles which characterized the earliest Amer-
ican decisions. The early view is authoritatively expressed by
Justice Sharswood in these words: "The principles of the feudal
system, in truth, underlie all the doctrines of the common law in
regard to real estate, and wherever that law is recognized, recourse
must be had to feudal principles to understand and carry out the
common law." In Lyle vs. Richards, 9 S. & R. 333, Chief Justice
Tilghman said: "The principles of the feudal system are so inter-
woven with our jurisprudence that there is no removing them with-
out destroying the whole texture." In McCall vs. Neeley, 3 Watts
71, Chief Justice Gibson said: "Yet feudal tenures may be said
to exist among us in their consequences, and the qualities which
they originally imparted to estates; as for instance, in precluding
every limitation founded upon an abeyance of a fee." These cita-
tions show the bias of the early judicial mind towards adhering
to feudal principles. It may be safely said that at present the
current of opinion is strong against the feudal doctrines in the
courts; that many of them have been abrogated or modified by
statute, and that the present establishment is almost purely alo-
dial, both in principle and in practice.
6. The feudal lord paramount exercised the function of
administration, and owned a very valuable franchise.
Although the feudal doctrines have lost their force as binding
principles, both in England and America, yet, in the matter of
the general and possessory forms of ownership, and their numer-
ous variations, those same doctrines and practices are the standards
and furnish the analogies by which the sufficiency and validity of
a particular interest in land are to be tested; and it is impossible
'to come to a reliable conclusion as to any matter respecting estates
in land without running down the doctrine from the feudal system
and through the common law, as well as through the American
decisions and statutes.
Under the feudal theory and practice, rights of enjoyment
over a particular parcel of land were to be traced through the fol-
lowing succession of relationships. The king was the sole "owner,"
his was the dominium directum; it would never pass out of his
sovereign prerogative. He conferred the "possession" upon the
knight with very large and intricate, almost unlimited, powers of
dealing with it. By way of return for the privileges and immu-
nities, conferred upon him, the knight undertook fealty to the
king, and the performance of acts of valuable service in his sup-
port and maintenance. Among the powers over the land conferred
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upon him was that of "holding" the land under the warrant and
authority of the king; and also that of investing others with the
possession, to hold under his warrant and authority, in a rela-
tion of dependence and inferiority, similar to that between the
knight and the king. This investiture of inferiors took three forms:
(1) When the knight transferred the possession of the whole of his
feud together with the identical privileges and immunities which
he enjoyed. This he could do only with the consent of the king,
and was in all respects an assignment. (2) When he transferred the
possession of the whole of his feud, but with different privileges
and immunities. This he was allowed to do, since such an interest
would be less than what he enjoyed; and consequently his trans.
feree would hold under his warrant and authority and not be sub-
stituted in his place. (3) (a.) When he transferred part of his feud
with the entire sum of privileges and immunities, as applied to that
part. This he might do since the transferee would hold of him
and not be substituted in his place. (b) When he transferred part
3f his feud, but with different privileges and immunities. This he
might do, since his transferee's interest would be inferior to his,
and the transferee would hold of him and not be substituted
in his place. As the knight was a soldier, and his only capacity as
well as duty was to perform military service, it is readily seen
that what the king conferred upon him was the very valuable fran-
chise of dealing with the land in a way to support himself, and to
enable him to furnish his quota of soldiers upon the call of the
king. Thus, on the one hand, the king secured a military retainer,
who would also incidentally furnish pecuniary assistance upon
occasion; and the knight secured a very valuable franchise, to-
gether with social and political privileges and immunities gen-
erally considered to be of still greater value. The person upon
whom the knight conferred the possession to "hold of" him
was called "vassal." The knight's feudal designation was Lord
Paramount. In many instances in the American Colonies he was
called Lord Proprietor. He did not sell his lands, but farmed them
out; he remained always proprietor.
After the investiture of the knight by the king, the relation
resulted consisting of (1) fealty to the person of the king; (2) the
king's right to receive the render and service agreed upon; (3) the
king's sovereign power to re-enter for condition broken; and (4)
the reverter of the possession to the king, if the descent from the
knight should become extinct. If the king re-entered for condition
broken, or there was a reverter to him because of failure of heirs,
all grants made by the knight determined, and the king received
the land back without any incumbrances. On the other hand, the
knight "held of? the king; by which is meant that he "held" by
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the warrant and authority "of" the king; that is, he was author-
ized to vouch and call upon the king as his friend and powerful
patron.
It is to be noted with considerable emphasis that the knight
might create and confer upon his vassal both the possession and
the inheritance, but for a limited duration in time only, or upon
a condition. In both these cases, notwithstanding he had parted
with the inheritance, the knight still enjoyed an "interest" or
"estate" in the land; for he was still entitled to the privileges and
immunities of a landholder; he had still the right to receive the
valuable services from his vassal; he had the reverter and right of
re-entry; and he had, further, the right to receive the land back
upon the extinction of the vassal's descent, by escheat. Thus, the
knight had an interest or estate in the land which arose out of his
relation as landholder under the king, but did not inhere in the land
itself. His was a separate and independent interest; was an in-
dependent species of real property, and descended to his heirs,
just as. the right of possession and the usufruct descended to the vas-
sal's heirs, if his interest was one of inheritance.
§ 7. The vassal's was a particular interest, carved out of the
general interest of the lord paramount.
Vhen the knight conferred the possession and usufruct upon
the vassal, the relation resulting between these two was essentially
the same as that between the king and the knight, with some ex-
ceptions to be very carefully noted. The holding conferred upon
the knight was absolute; that is, it endured in time as long as the
knight had heirs and it was free from conditions, except fealty
and service. In legal contemplation, no man can die- without heirs,
and consequently, it was considered that the knight's "interest"
would endure in time forever. But when the knight conferred the
possession and an interest on the vassal, the gift might be either
for a modified inheritance, or for a period of time measured by the
life of a human being in existence at the time of the gift; it could
not be for any form of descent other than that prescribed in the
canons of descent; and it could not be measured to determine upon
the happening of an event the time of whose occurrence was known
or could be ascertained. It was necessary that the "interest" con-
ferred upon the vassal should be less than that invested in the
knight; since the scheme of military and political organization re-
quired that there should be a relation of fealty and service existing
between the knight and his vassal, in all respects similar in effect
to that between the knight and the king. Any such limited in-*
terest, less than the knight's interest, was known, and is still
known, as a "particular" interest; as being a part or bit carved
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out of the whole and entire interest of the knight. If this "par-
ticular" interest was one which.was without the inheritance qual-
ity, then, during its continuance, the knight had a vested "interest"
in the land, which was and still is called "the Reversion." This
reversion *would pass down the line of the knight's descendants by
inheritance; and it could be assigned by the knight to another. The
assignment of the reversion carried with it the "inheritance."
The vassal might or might not occupy the land in person; if he
did not, he could assign his interest; or he could let the land to an-
other for that other's lifetime; or he could let it to another for a
definite period of time. The last resulted in a relationship based
upon contract or servility, which were relations inconsistent with
the relation of landholder; wherefore there was no transfer of the
possession to the contract or slave tenant, and it remained, accord-
ingly, with the vassal. Consequently, these last interests did not
constitute real property, but were only personal property and are
such today.
Thus there were always three and generally four persons hav-
ing at the same time, each a separate and distinct interest in the
same identical piece of land or feud. Each of these several inter-
ests was called, and is still called, an "estate." The king's estate
was that of "direct ownership," and it never passed out of his pre-
rogative as sovereign lord. Although the office and prerogative
of king never ceases, yet the person will die; and the fealty which
the knight swore was personal to the individual then king. Upon
the succession of a new king, the knight must swear allegiance
anew; and upon his rendering fealty to the new person, the knight's
original interest continued. The benefits which the king received
were fealty and service; the reverter'and re-entry; and patronage.
The knight was entitled to the privileges and immunities of his
caste; and other valuable returns and rights which have been fully
set out above. Neither the king nor the knight had the possession;
that was with the vassal; who, in turn, had the privileges and im-
miunities of his caste, and other privileges and powers similar to
those of the knight. If the vassal did not occupy the land in per-
son, he let it to the occupancy of another who was his contract or
servile tenant, one who had no interest in the land, whatever, but
only a personal right against the vassal arising out of contract or
servility.
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§ 8. The feudal system was a compactly articulated economic,
political, and social organism, whose vital spirit was the king's pre-
rogative ownership of the source of supply of the necessaries of
life.
The feudal system had. as its object the building and con-
serving of a political and social organization in support of the
king's prerogative as sovereign lord by rendering every person
either mediately or immediately dependent upon him through
economic. control. This was accomplished by treating land as the
ultimate source of sustenance, and assigning to each man a place,
condition, status, or estate, which was both political and social and
varied with the character of his relation to some part of the public
domain of land. By this scheme of organization the only persons
who were citizens and had any degree of political liberty were
those who had an interest of present or future enjoyment of the
possession of a parcel of land, or feud. These were knitted to-
gether into a compact organization, the bond being the support of
the king. Fealty to the person of the king was essential to political
and civil liberty. The spirit of the organization was allegiance to
the same individual; there was no conception of the common wel-
fare. as established in America. The common welfare was embodied,
it began and ended in the welfare of the king. This organization
was the political society which constituted the State; but the con-
ception of a State was a far different idea then from what it is now.
Under that system the entire source of sustenance was pooled and
divided into holdings. The franchise of administering these hold-
ings was conferred upon individuals, to each a holding. These in-
dividuals formed a very powerful caste or class. In general, the
terms of holding were the same, except that the services to be ren-
dered varied. These had the common character that they were
military. These feud holders were in immediate relation with the
king, but in no immediate relation with each other. There was no
bond that bound them together, except that they were severally
bound to support the king. They enjoyed, however, certain social
and political privileges and immunities, participation in which
raised something of an obligation to support the order against all
who were not members of the caste. Each of these immediate sup-
porters of the king administered his parcel or feud independently
of the others, but so as that he collected under him and bound to his
person by fealty a body of supporters who were in immediate re-
lation with himself and thus, mediately, with the king. The body
of the supporters of the same lord were bound to each other only
mediately; that is, through their lord. The whole body of the sup-
porters of the lords, being two degrees removed from the king,
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formed, also, a caste or class having certain social and political
privileges and immunities, community of interest in which bound
them together in some fashion. Thus the scheme was to build
up a compact organization the members of which were divided
into classes of graded superiority and inferiority and knitted to-
gether by the common bond of economic dependence upon the king,
who had a monopoly of the land. Every man was inferior and de-
pendent upon a superior politically, socially and economically. The
bond between the superior and inferior was that of fealty and
service by the inferior in return for the possession of the superior's
land.
§ 9. Free citizenship and citizen ownership have taken the
place of the articulated organism built upon prerogative.
As a scientific establishment, the feudal system was perfect,
and it suffered the fate of all perfection, disintegration. No sooner
was it inaugurated than it became the object of attack from all
sides; the subtlety and finesse of the Norman ecclesiastic and law-
yer; the political and social intrigue and jealousy of the lords, strug-
gling to preserve their wealth and political control; but above all,
though not so obtrusive, the innate sense and spirit of liberty which
characterized the substrata, who were eternally pushing upwards
with all the, silent force, and. i creasing surge of the growing oak,
or of the Messianic Hope. Out of it all, through five hundred
years, was evolved the structure of the common law which was
brought. to America by the colonists; During the two hundred
and seventy years of the English colonies, a new shoot was put out
from the old stock, which, seven hundred years after the im-
position of the original stem, became itself the organism of the
alodial system of land holding of the American States. At the
time of the Revolution, little remained of the feudal establishment
except -an extremely complicated- system of "Estates." Some re-
mains of the privileges and immunities of the castes obtained in the
colonial days, and to some extent in the States after the Rev-
olution. It may be that in some sections at the present time, only
"free-holders" may serve as grand jurors, and justices of the
county court. Buit the social and political privileges which were
features of the ownership of a freeholder have passed away in all
other particulars. The political upheaval of the Revolutionary pe-
riod was a social upheaval as well. The class system was broken
down and equality among, citizens. was established -in its stead.
Participation 'iL government is not dependent upon land owner-
ship. The monopoly of land in prerogative has been repudiated.
No one is the superior of another through land proprietorship. The
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great power and peculiar privileges 6f the lord paramount have been
alolished. The personal relation of fealty between lord and vas-
tal never obtained in America. The entire structure of a State u.,&-
posed of landholders has fallen. In its place has arisen a com-
munity of human beings, who are self-determining and whose po-
litical and social relations are directly with each other; and
there "are no privileged classes recognized by law. This was ac-
6omplished in the main by striking at the apex; by destroying the
supreme sovereign ownership and monopoly of land, and the fran-
chise of the lord paramount. The relation of the State is now only
with the land, and not the owner. Through the police power alone
does the State exercise any control over the owner. But the doc-
trines of possession, holding, occupancy, reverter, re-entry, inherit-
ance, and "estates" survive.
.§ 10. The American State has only the rights of sovereignty
against the land; personal allegiance of the owner is abolished.
When, during the period of 1775-1800, the inhabitants of the
territories which had been the colonial possessions settled the form
and organized the agencies of government, they did not erect a
system of land administration having none of the features of that
to which they were accustomed. On the contrary, they did not go
far afield from perpetuating by express recognition and establish-
ment as legal practices those customs which had been used among
them for many years. They established a liberty of action in the
form of a mutual convention or constitution, which embodied their
tried experience and achievement, with some theories which, it was
believed, would add to their plan. The doctrines and theories of the
feudal holding found no place in their scheme; these had been in
fact overthrown already, although they retained some influence
through the forms which remained. In the matter of the regula-
tion-of right of property in land, they were extremely conservative;
they proceeded not by rooting up everything that existed, but by
accommodating the then existing practices to the changed political
and social establishment. By abolishing the office and power
of king and of lord proprietor, they released that direct owner-
ship of land which the king had held under the authority of God
alone: That direct ownership the king had organized according to
a highly specialized system of sub-holdings and vice regal tenan-
cies for the peace and protection of the kingdom, and the perpetua-
tion of his own power. In the process, he elevated some individuals
and conferred upon them exclusive privileges and immunities; oth-
ers he reduced to -slavery and deprived of all civil and political
standing. This was carried into effect through the force of obli-
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gations, enforceable by him not through direct control of the land,
but through a personal relation between him and his tenants. The
feudatory had the land, but the feudatory and not the land fur-
nished support to the king. The king farmed out the land and
took the personal security of the feudatory. In the change from
the old to the new dispensation, the direct ownership of land was
reposed in the State; but the artificial system under which that
ownership was organized and administered was destroyed root.
and branch. The structure which was erected by the fathers of
the constitution was not built upon the cornerstone of land hold-
ing; citizenship was substituted. Holding was taken over by the
State. The military feature of a standing army was forbidden. The
special relation which had existed between the citizen and the
State growing out of land holding was abrogated. Land became
the subject of common and customary property right in all respects
as personalty. The State's relation was established as general,
not special, with the land as a part of the public domain; not per-
sonal with the citizen as its tenant. Those sovereign powers over
the land which were not a part of the feudal system were re-
tained; that is, the war power, taxation, eminent domain and ulti-
mate succession. The only personal relation which the State has
with the citizen-owner is that which grows out of the duty of
"holding"; that is, the regulative and protective function which we
call the police power. Forfeitures for breach of allegiance were
abolished. The citizen owner was given no power to administer his
land for the purpose of establishing a petty kingdom under his own
rule. Escheat was abolished; the ultimate succession in the State
substituted. This citizen owner was forbidden to install another to
hold under him by personal allegiance, or fealty. The only allegi-
ance provided for was to the State. The duties of citizenship and
the relation of contract took the place of the relation of lord and
vassal. The certain render of a composition in the way of taxes
enforceable against the land was substituted for the uncertain
calls of the feudal burdens demandable of the owner. Only one
holding was recognized, and that was to be absolute, constant,
customary, and free, and not subject to legislative interference.
The citizen-owner cannot transfer his holding, and yet retain a
hold on the land or on the transferee; the transferror is deprived
of all power of ownership, however remote.' The only vestiges that
can remain to him are the right of re-entry for condition broken,
and the possibility of a reverter; neither of which is an interest in
the land, or an element of ownership.
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§ 11. Citizen ownership is a conception existing only in the
limitations of American law.
That ownership which the American State exercises under the
authority of the grace of God and the .Aat of. the inhabitants it has
organized under no logically articulated' system at all. It has
created no new organism, but has imposed itself as the head of
such a system as might be deduced from the customary usages prac-
ticed at the time of the Revolution, modified by such constitutional
enactments as were formulated during that period. Its function was,
not to overturn the existing scheme of property right in land, but
to introduce settlers to their places and clothe them with the
possession to hold under its sovereignty. The only terms of hold-
ing specified are those imported in the words of its grant, "to have
and to hold to him, the said A B and his heirs and assigns for-
ever." By common understanding everywhere, and by express
enactment in some places, the interest conferred by the State is
that of "Alodial Ownership"; that is, exclusive of the superior and
intermediate right of any other private person interposed between
the owner and the State. The general characters and powers of
alodial ownership have been already detailed incidentally in the
preceding pages; its powers and particular characteristics as prac-
ticed in the American States are not certainly and definitely estab-
lished. .The most frequent expressiou is that the donee of the State
is "owner," and that the State has conferred upon him the "own-
ership." It seems to be reasonably settled that the State's grant is
not a sale, since the only person to whom the State could transfer
its sovereignty would be another sovereign. The only possible
donee of the State is its inferior. The ownership, then, conferred
by the State, is not one that can be asserted against itself, but must
be held in subjection to its authority. Its custodianship for the
public benefit, that it may be retained and conserved as a perma-
nent refuge and domicile for the body politic, cannot be transferred.
'While the grantee becomes owner, yet, as compared with the direct
ownership by the authority of God alone, he is owner only sub
modo; that is, qualifiedly or with limitations. He acquires an own-
ership which inherently imports the possession; which is subject
to the necessities of the political society which confers it; and sub-
ject, also, to the same society's sovereign power and obligation to
regulate the extent, the modes and manner of user and enjoyment.
This ownership has an existence only in the contemplation of the
American law, and then only in legal definition. It has no ab-
solute existence, but only in its limitations. In other words, the
State guarantees to the private landowner a liberty of action in
dealing with his parcel which consists in a group of specific powers;
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the boundaries of which are laid down only in common intendment;
and are to be discovered only in the maxims and customs of the
people as they existed at the period of the Revolution, or have
been-modified by constitutional enactment since that time. It is an
abstract conception, not capable of variations; it is conferred in
pursuance of general laws controlling the State authority; its prop-
erties are fixed,-and cannot be qualified by terms and conditions of
special grant; it is "free," that is, not "villein"; and it is "com-
mon," that is, of certain and universal custom.
§ 12. The State sets aside to the citizen owner a parcel of the
public domain, and holds it to his use.
The alodial ownership of the citizen owner is to be properly
regarded as the ultimate and entire private property right in land.
It is the Mother Earth out of whose body and elements all interests
are formed. It may be described as that particular form of mas-
tery or dominion over physical objects which the law prescribes
in respect .of land, as the law of the relation of State and land-
owner. Its limits are not to be found in the statutes; this part
of the law has never been reduced to a code; and it is submitted
that in the American States, the power of the legislature extends
only to its regulation and protection. The principles are part of
the unwritten constitution, and, as such, cannot be taken away by
anything less than a. change by express declaration of the people
themselves upon due deliberation. Each of the fundamental prin-
ciples is a vested right of property as opposed to -a mere police reg-
ulation. Its qualities and powers and their forms and doctrines
were vested in the donee when the State installed the first private
owner to possess according to the custom of the country. Such
grants as were made before the Revolution have been brought into
conformity with the standard .then fixed, and all subsequent grants
have been uniform. .The State undertakes and engages to appro-
priate, devote, keep back and. forever defend,. that is, to "hold,"
the particular parcel to the uses and possessory right of the donee
and his heirs and assigns forever. It would be apparent without
statement that ownership cannot be conferred upon one who has
not taken the possession at the time of the donation. That owner-
ship of land in any form can be taken over by one who has not the
physical dominion- over the object at the time is unthinkable. It is
true that a right to enter and take the physical -dominion may be
acquired; but such a right would'not invest the donee with pro-
prietorship, with all its respoisibilities, and its privileges-and advan-
tages. The loss* or absence of, the specific, identical thing could
be compensated for in damages. If such were the case, landowner-
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ship would become the subject of dealing in futures on the curb-
stone. So that possession is antecedent to ownership, and a condi-
tion precedent. Under the land laws of the Federal Government,
the patentee must not only be in the possession at the time of the
patent, but also in the occupancy. The State systems require some
sort of physical improvement of the soil. The donee or patentee
thus constituted owner has a limited privilege of "holding" by the
power of his own arms and those of his own servants; certainly
against one who is in the act of intruding upon him suddenly and
by force. This power of holding the State vindicates by extending
over the owner immunity from answerability for the injury he
may cause in defense. The State performs the function of holder
under all other circumstances; either by the exercise of force in a
proper case, or by restoring to possession the person disseised; by
process from a court.
13. Inheritance as a quality of the estate has been sub-
stituted for inheritance as a privilege of blood.
Furthermore, the State does not divest itself of all connection
with the land when it makes a grant of a parcel to a private per-
son. On the contrary, the State's custodianship and sovereign pow-
ers run with the land upon terms which may be asserted against the
owner, whoever he may be; not alone against the State's immedi-
ate grantee or donee, or his heirs. The quality and extent of the
donee's ownership are measured by the calls of that connection;
and the same limitations upon direct or absolute ownership follow
the land as qualifications or modifications of right or estate into
whosever hands the land may come, or by whatever title. The
feudal "Estate" could never pass out of the donee or the line of
his descendants; it could not be transferred except by a proceeding
to which the lord was a party, and amounted to his acceptance of
the new tenant; and if the donee's line of descent became extinct,
the land was freed from the interest by the entry of the lord, or
continued in another by his acquiescence amounting to a new in-
vestiture. Under the alodial system, the donee of the state may con-
fer the possession and transfer his interest or estate to another
without any special permission or license of the State; that is con-.
ferred by general provision of the law. Moreover, upon the death
of an owner without heirs, there is no escheat to the State's donee
or his heirs, but a succession to the State itself.
Under the early feudal law, the inheritance was personal to-
the donee; that is, it was limited to the blood kin of that indi-
vidual within the canons of descent. The conferring upon the
knight of the inheritance was the gift of a benefit to be confined.
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to the enjoyment of himself and his descending blood-line. His in-
terest did not die with his person, but with the extinction of h is
inheritable blood. It did not run with the land, but with the blopd.
In the early days, the knight could not confer the possession upon
another, and at the same time invest him with either the benefit of
the enjoyment throughout the period of existence of deseendants.
of the knight; or throughout the period of the continuance of de-
scent from the donee. Thus the greatest period of time for which
the possession might be conveyed was the life of the donee. He
could not convey his own inheritance, because the succession could
not be diverted from his own heirs. He had no authority to confer
the inheritable quality upon another's blood. The second of these
doctrines still remains in the form of the maxim that no landholder
can create any new inheritance. As has been seen, the inheritance
is a constant character of the interest or estate and is fixed by the
custom. The first of these doctrines has also remained intact,
namely, that the owner cannot confer upon another the inherit-
ance to endure in the donee's blood as long as the owner has
heirs. But the owner has the power to transmit to the donee an
interest which will descend along the blood line of the donee or of
any of his assignees. The effect of the Statute Quia Enptores in
this particular was to convert the inheritance from a privilege of
blood into a quality of interest or estate which runs with the land
for the owner, whoever he might be. The interest itself determines
when the person who last dies owner leaves no heirs according to
the canons of descent.
A further effect of the Statute Quia Emptores is that it is
proper, perhaps indispensable, to add the words '"and assigns" to
the word "heirs," in order to convey the entire interest--'to have
and to hold unto the said A B and his heirs and assigns forever."
Without the words "and assigns" it would not be impossible to con-
ceive that a grantor intended to reserve the inheritable quality to
his own blood, and not confer it upon that of the grantee. Black-
stone says, Book II, 289: "But by degrees this feudal severity is
worn off; and experience hath shown that property best answers
the purposes of civil life, especially in commercial countries, when
its transfer and circulation are totally free and unrestrained. The
road was cleared in the first place by a law of King Henry the
irst, which allowed a man to sell and dispose of lands which he
himself had purchased; for over these he was thought to have a
more extensive power than over what had been transmitted to him
in a course of descent, from his ancestors; a doctrine which is coun-
tenanced by the feudal constitutions themselves; but he was not
allowed to sell the whole of his own acquirements, so as -totally to
disinherit his children, any more than he was at liberty to aliene
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his paternal estate. Afterwards a man seems to have been at lib-
erty to part with all his own acquisitions, if he had previously
purchased to him and his assigns by name; but, if his assigns were
not specified in the purchase deed, he was not empowered to aliene;
and also he might part with one-fourth of the inheritance of his
ancestors without the consent of his heir."
§ 14. The State confers only one form of ownership, which is
general and uniform, and consists in defined powers.
No complete enumeration of the qualities and incidents which
attach to alodial ownership has been made; nor of the specific pow-
ers which may be exercised by the alodial owner. The following
lists, it is believed, include them all, either by specific mention or
by reasonable import. But no basis of classification has ever been
laid down by any of the writers; and the complexity of the con-
ception seems to preclude the .possibility of drawing up anything
more than a- tentative arrangement, such as that which" follows:
I. Qualities and Incidents:
1. It is designated by the words "and his heirs and as-
signs forever."
2. It descends to heirs indefinitely.
3. It may be forfeited for crime.
4. It is liable for debt.
5. It is a privilege of citizens only.
6. It succeeds to the State upon defect of inheritable
blood.
II. Specific Powers:
1. To have and to hold; which is the exercise of posses-
sion, and includes the right to re-enter by writ of
unlawful entry and detainer, or by action.
2. To take and enjoy the fruits and the comforts and
conveniences.
3. To alienate it freely by grant or devise.
4. To sub-divide the land, and convey parcels.
5. To encumber the possession with mortgages and liens.
6. To encumber the land with easements and servitudes.
7. To limit the user and enjoyment by special covenants
running with the land.
8. To originate and confer upon others particular forms
of interests and estates.
In general, it may be said that the alodial ownership of the
citizen owner is limited in quantity, but absolute in ruality; and
that its form and content of terms are constant; that is, the State
can and does confer only one mode of ownership, and that is of a
rigidly stereotyped formula. LYMAN CHALKLBY.
